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‘This loopy idea’ An analysis of UKIP’s social media discourse in relation to rurality 
and climate change. 
 
Abstract  
 
This paper focuses on the way that United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) attempted to 
communicate its policies and messages about the topic of renewable energy during 2013-14.   
Renewable energy is a fruitful topic to consider as it has a strategic importance in the 
discussion of the future of the UK while it raises questions about the role of science in 
politics, the tensions between the value of particular, mostly rural, places.  The emergent 
theme from the analysis was not only rurality and renewable energy but the connection of the 
latter issue to scepticism about climate change.   
 
With the emergence of new forms of media, in particular, social media, the means of 
representation are more closely in the control of political actors.  The immediacy and 
frequency of communication through platforms such as Twitter has added another strand of 
published materials to the more familiar pamphlets, reports, and manifestos.   This paper uses 
the novel approach of the qualitative analyses the social media posts of one key UKIP 
representative and a sample of the linked materials, in tandem with newspaper coverage, to 
reveal the key themes in the UKIP discourse.   
 
 
Key words 
 
UKIP; climate change; renewable energy; social media; rural 
 
DRAFT 
 
 
Dr Matthew Reed 
The Countryside and Community Research Institute  
The University of Gloucestershire 
Oxstalls Campus 
Oxstalls Lane 
Gloucester 
GL2 9HW 
 
mreed@glos.ac.uk 
  
Reed  
 2 
‘This loopy idea’ An analysis of UKIP’s social media discourse in relation to rurality 
and climate change. 
 
Abstract  
 
This paper focuses on the way that United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) attempted to 
communicate its policies and messages about the topic of renewable energy during 2013-14.   
Renewable energy is a fruitful topic to consider as it has a strategic importance in the 
discussion of the future of the UK while it raises questions about the role of science in 
politics, the tensions between the value of particular, mostly rural, places.  The emergent 
theme from the analysis was not only rurality and renewable energy but the connection of the 
latter issue to scepticism about climate change.   
 
With the emergence of new forms of media, in particular, social media, the means of 
representation are more closely in the control of political actors.  The immediacy and 
frequency of communication through platforms such as Twitter has added another strand of 
published materials to the more familiar pamphlets, reports, and manifestos.   This paper uses 
the novel approach of the qualitative analyses the social media posts of one key UKIP 
representative and a sample of the linked materials, in tandem with newspaper coverage, to 
reveal the key themes in the UKIP discourse.   
 
 
Key words 
 
UKIP; climate change; renewable energy; social media; rural 
 
  
Reed  
 3 
 
“This loopy idea that we can cover Britain in ugly disgusting ghastly windmills 
and that somehow our future energy needs will come from that” 
(Nigel Farage, Leader of UKIP, quoted in (Ward, 2013). 
 
Introduction  
 
The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) has risen to be one of the challenger parties 
to the existing system of politics in the UK, with a focus on membership of the EU, the 
effects of immigration on British society and attacks on the Westminster elite.  Most research 
by political scientists to date has focused on the psephology of UKIPs support, its possible 
consequences for existing parties, and the possibility of, then its prospects in, an in/out 
referendum on EU membership (Abedi & Lundberg, 2008; Ford & Goodwin, 2014; Goodwin 
& Milazzo, 2015).  UKIP has argued that its challenge is broader than these core topics and it 
has a series of policies that underpin its claims about being a serious political party.  To date, 
scholarly attention has focused less on these policies and, the particular ways in which UKIP 
seeks to communicate its arguments.  Analysis of topics other than the main three themes of 
UKIP may help in assessing whether UKIP does have a wider policy platform, the scope, and 
form of their support, as well as their campaigning tactics.   
 
This paper focuses on the way that UKIP attempted to communicate its policies and 
messages about the topic of renewable energy during 2013-14 when it had seen success in the 
European Parliamentary elections and was preparing for what it anticipated being greater 
success in the General Election of 2015 (Goodwin and Milazzo 2015).   Renewable energy is 
a fruitful topic to consider as it has a strategic importance in discussion of the future of the 
UK whilst it raises questions about the role of science in politics, the tensions between the 
value of particular, mostly rural, places in relation to wider societal goals, and how the state 
should intervene in markets (Mitchell & Connor, 2004; van der Horst, 2007).  During this 
period all the major political parties were campaigning about the cost of domestic energy 
bills, making it a topic of more generalised debate, within which context UKIP made their 
contribution.   As will become apparent the emergent theme from the analysis was not simply 
rurality and renewable energy but the connection of the latter theme to scepticism about 
climate change.  
 
How political parties communicate their messages has been the focus of sustained scholarly 
interest, most recently through the role of marketing in campaigning, as well as analysis of 
the role of discourse (Chadwick, 2000; G Cook, 2004; Wodak, KhosraviNik, & Mral, 2013).   
With the emergence of new forms of media, in particular, social media, the means of 
representation are more closely in the control of political actors (Castells, 2007; Miller, 
Ginnis, Stobart, Krasodomski-Jones, & Clemence, 2015).  The immediacy and frequency of 
communication through platforms such as Twitter has added another strand of published 
materials to the more familiar pamphlets, reports, and manifestos.  Social media is often 
treated as a separate activity to other forms of persuasive messaging and activities, in part 
because it has often been considered quantitatively with little consideration of the detail of 
the content or the materials toward which the social media directs the reader (Turcotte, York, 
Irving, Scholl, & Pingree, 2015).  This paper uses the novel approach of the qualitative 
analyses the social media posts of one key UKIP representative and a sample of the linked 
materials, along with more traditional media coverage in newspapers, to reveal the key 
themes in the UKIP discourse.   
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UKIPs concerns are explicitly spatial, and renewable energy offers an opportunity to analyse 
the tensions between these interests and mostly rural places that provide a different set of 
political opportunities than the urban and suburban areas where most politics is conducted 
(Reed, 2015; Woods, 2005).  As Woods argues ‘rural politics’ is about the social and 
economic relationships within rural areas, while ‘the politics of the rural’ suggests the wider 
symbolic uses of rurality in political debates generally about a sense of tradition and 
continuity (Woods 2005). Other authors have noted the importance of ‘nation’ and ‘tradition’ 
to many supporters of UKIP, suggesting that the politics of the rural may be significant 
within their discourse but little attention has been paid to how this might link to rural politics 
(Wellings & Baxendale, 2015).  
 
This paper progresses by first contemplating the literature about UKIP to identify the ways in 
which its political platform is understood and how that links to its campaigning activity that 
leads into a discussion of the use of the term discourse in this context.  One of the innovations 
offered in this paper is to analyse social media in parallel with other media coverage, the 
justification for this approach and an elucidation of the method used is the next section of the 
paper.  From this point, examples of the media collected are used to discuss the themes found 
through the analysis of how these link to UKIPs discourse.  The paper concludes by 
contemplating how UKIP’s arguments about renewables frame the topic within a concern for 
free markets, climate change scepticism and a championing of fossil fuels.   Renewable 
energy is used as a route to return the debate to UKIP’s three main themes, local protests are 
used opportunistically and climate change scepticism emerges as a theme, suggesting that 
they are not broadening their policy platform but rather remain a narrowly defined political 
party.  
 
Understanding UKIP  
 
The rise of UKIP is part of a wider trend of an increase in radical, ‘populist’ parties in many 
democratic nations ranging from the Tea Party in the US through to the True Finns in Finland 
(Arter, 2010; Betz, 1993).   UKIP’s rise has been tempered by the British electoral system, 
which places very high barriers in the way of emergent parties gaining Parliamentary 
representation, pushing them to second order elections especially the European Parliamentary 
elections held under a more proportionate system. This trend has resulted in the ironic 
position that the European Parliament has been the platform from which UKIP has organised 
much of its campaign for the UK to the leave the EU.  Formed in 1993 by those opposed to 
the increasing integration of the EU, for many years, UKIP was a marginal player in electoral 
politics (Ford and Goodwin 2014).  Quite whether it would ever be able to become a 
dominant electoral force has been a consistent focus of scholarly attention, as has attempting 
to characterise its emerging political offer (Ford, Goodwin, & Cutts, 2011).  
 
More recently attention has come to focus on what drives the UKIP political prescription 
instead of solely its electoral chances and challenges (Tournier-Sol, 2015).  Partly this is 
because it is clear that an electoral breakthrough, beyond the second order elections, seems 
unlikely and as one of its primary goals, a referendum on UK membership, has been realised. 
The Conservative Party offered a referendum as part of its 2015 manifesto in part because the 
diversion of votes away from them toward UKIP was damaging to their chances of re-
election (Evans & Mellon, 2015; Goodwin & Milazzo, 2015).  Simultaneously it became 
apparent that appeal of UKIP was spreading beyond Conservative voters to those who had 
previously supported Labour and the Liberal Democrats.  While the topic of EU membership 
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remains the central goal of UKIP, widening its campaigning toward immigration has allowed 
it to emerge from the fringe. 
 
A libertarian, Unionist, English, populist party UKIP has sought to appeal to what Ford and 
Goodwin have described as ‘the left behind’ angry section of contemporary British society.  
As Wellings and Baxendale have noted, through the moves to devolution within the UK and 
the rise of the Scots and Welsh nationalist parties, feelings of English nationalism have been 
increasingly mobilised by UKIP (Wellings and Baxendale 2015).  The EU is the target but 
the feelings and experiences that fuel support for UKIP are embedded in recent British 
experience for particular groups, especially older, white, English men (Lord Ashcroft, 2012).  
UKIP supporters seek to escape from what they see as the fetters of the state apparatus and 
big business which prevent the self-determination of the British.  This sense of Englishness is 
often framed nostalgically, and turns its face against the recent waves of migration and harks 
back to the years before the end of Empire.  During the twentieth century, this was often 
framed as a relationship with rural landscapes, and rural areas being the ethnic homelands of 
the English (Matless, 1998; McKay, 2000).  Finally, the party frames itself as being one of 
the outsiders who are frustrating the plans of the self-serving metropolitan elite.   In this 
view, detailed policy prescriptions and coherent platforms are less important than the genuine 
sentiments that UKIP embodies and articulates.  It is a narrative of social disenchantment and 
civic disenfranchisement met by a popular, English revolt (Myers, 2004).  
 
In this context, the protests and contention around renewable energy would seem an 
opportunity for UKIP’s narrative (Eltham, Harrison, & Allen, 2008; Stevenson, 2009).  The 
UK government had committed itself to an ambitious suite of policies to boost low carbon 
energies by 2020. Through a combination of measures to create demand for the energy from 
renewables and incentives to supply it, all of which were to be paid for through consumer 
energy bills (Jacobsson et al., 2009).    Energy generation is broadly a rural matter whether it 
is RE schemes for wind or solar, or a new nuclear energy plant on the coast of Somerset or 
fracking in national parks or on farmland.  Many schemes are met by sustained opposition, 
cutting edge technology is often not seen as adding to the beauty of the culturally cherished 
landscape and the carefully cultivated agro-ecosystems of British rural landscapes 
(Etherington, 2009; Woods & Goodwin, 2003).  As this opposition gained momentum, it 
began to spread to other projects such as off-shore arrays of wind turbines and solar farms.   
RE started to pit national policy goals against local planning committees, in a context where 
many of the previous party political loyalties were already dissolving.  The anti-wind farm 
groups did not cohere into a movement but remained a loose network of people contesting 
projects in their area, as the subject became part of rural politics as well as the politics of the 
rural (Reed 2015, Woods 2015).  The major political parties have all backed the need for RE 
and the low carbon agenda, except for UKIP.  
 
Methods  
 
The methods and approach of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is an interdisciplinary 
approach concerned with investigating the linguistic character of socio-cultural structures or 
processes (Titscher, Meyer, Wodak, & Vetter, 2000).  Society and culture are shaped by 
discourse and are simultaneously constituted by it, with power being manifest within 
discourse and through it (Foucault, 2000).   Discourses are always situated in a particular 
historical and social context, within which they are always related to and in dialogue with 
other discourses through texts (Wodak et al., 2013).  In CDA text can be interpreted widely to 
include other semiotic forms such as images or sounds.  To fully understand the ideological 
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role of language it is necessary to comprehend the triangulation of discourse to understand 
the intentions of those who created the texts and the perceptions of those who receive the 
message.  Because of limitations of time this paper confines itself solely to the analysis of 
texts, leaving the other parts of the triangulation to future investigation.  Albeit, as discussed 
below, how these texts are structured can indicate the intentions of those forming the texts.  
 
The analysis of how political actors seek to represent their ideas and actions have a very long 
tradition, to which new forms of social media append another strand of activity in the 
analysis of political discourse (Chadwick, 2000; Freeden, 1998).  These new forms of media 
differ in that they are more immediately interactive, can be directed to supporters or other 
interested parties more quickly and through intertextuality augment other activities.  
Significantly social media is user-generated content, which is produced and reproduced in a 
network form, outside of the editorial controls of other forms of mass media.  It is logical to 
analyse not only the subject matter of the communication but that to which it connects if 
appropriate and the other contextual media from more established outlets.  In this paper, the 
social media output is analysed alongside the media to which it directs readers and the press 
coverage in newspapers, with the aim of understanding the interactions between the forms of 
media as well as the messages conveyed.  
 
Conover and colleagues undertook an analysis of 18,000 politically active Twitter users, 
across the political spectrum and conducted a quantitative analysis of the content of the 
postings, the social networks that could be discerned from these postings and biographical 
information from attached profiles (Conover, Goncalves, Flammini, & Menczer, 2012).  In 
contrast to earlier studies from 2008 they found that the political right had, in their 2011 
sample, become effective users of Twitter.  Their analysis reveals: 
a right-leaning constituency comprised of highly-active, politically-engaged social media 
users, a trend we see reflected in the communication and social networks in which these 
individuals participate (Conover, Goncalves, Flammini, & Menczer, 2012:5). 
More tightly networked than their opponents, right wing users are more active in creating 
political content in their tweets and vocal about their positions than their left-wing peers.  
These findings indicate that organising across and within social media has strategic aspects in 
group formation, the formation of messages and in disseminating content.  The quantitative 
methods used by Conover and collaborators relied on the use of hashtags (#) or indexing 
terms:  
We define the set of pertinent political communication as any tweet containing, at least, one 
political hashtag. While an individual can engage in political communication without 
including a hashtag, the potential audience for such content is limited primarily to his or her 
immediate followers (Conover, Goncalves, Flammini, & Menczer, 2012:5). 
Methodologically this opens an analytical space for studies of those users whose 
communication is intended for this limited audience and as the identification of political 
sentiment in quantitative studies is tied to the presence of these indexing terms. 
 
DiGrazia and colleagues have also used Twitter to discern voting intentions; their findings 
confirm those of Connover about the practical organisation of conservatives through social 
media in the US (Chew & Eysenbach, 2010; DiGrazia, McKelvey, Bollen, & Rojas, 2013).   
They point to the limitations of earlier studies but through an analysis of over ½ million 
tweets posted during 795 competitive election races in the US between 2010-12 found that 
social media has a role in indicating political behaviour.  Their evidence suggests that social 
media is linked to the social networks of those posting and is a better indicator of voting 
behaviour than the choice of TV viewing.  Although not directly indicative of electoral 
results large-scale analysis of social media, “indicate[s] that the ‘buzz’ or public discussion 
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about a candidate on social media can be used as an indicator of voter behaviour” (DiGrazia, 
McKelvey, Bollen, & Rojas, 2013:1).  They conclude that “social media activity provides a 
valid indicator of political decision making” that can form part of the future of the study of 
political behaviour.  
 
These previous studies have tended to be undertaken using quantitative 
techniques as part of attempts to assess the wider utility of social media analysis 
and are viewed as developments in the applications of information sciences (Conover et al., 
2011; Huberman, Romero, & Wu, 2008).  The literature on the analysis of social media in 
marketing more broadly acknowledges that the value of such studies would be in the 
qualitative detail, but this is burdensome because of the volume of materials (Choudhruy & 
Harrigan, 2014).  This paper differs in analysing social media alongside traditional press 
coverage and the inclusion of referent material by following a sample of hyperlinks, to 
consider the content of the social media in some detail.  In this manner, it seeks to link more 
established methods of analysing political discourse through the consideration of corpus of 
textual data with emerging technologies (G. Cook, 2015; Darier, 1999; Freeden, 1994).  All 
the Twitter postings are in the public domain, and the press material was collected via the 
Lexis-Nexis system to respect copyright. 
 
The sample of documents analysed comprises of three distinct bodies of text and attendant 
data. First, is the Twitter feed of the UKIP energy spokesperson the 
MEP Roger Helmer between the period of June 2012 and 16 April 2014 and a 
corpus of 4912 tweets, about 57% of the tweets he had posted since joining 
Twitter in January 2010. Alongside Helmer’s feed for reference those of his 
Party leader Nigel Farage MEP and as well as the official party twitter feed @UKIP_UK1. 
Because of the limitations of the software, it was not possible to collect all the tweets from 
these reference accounts but approximately 32% of all the posts published were obtained 
covering the period April 2013 through to April 2014. Similarly, it was not possible to collect 
an entirely consistent sample but the size of the sample goes some way to suggest it 
represents the arguments of UKIP; from Helmer’s account 4912 tweets were collected, from 
Farage’s 3195 and the UKIP account 3179; an aggregate of 16,966 tweets. 
 
A purposeful sample of a 1000 tweets from the Twitter feed of Roger Helmer were coded 
manually, with an inductive approach to code generation taken. These tweets covered the 
period October 2012 through to October 2013 and where possible documents linked to 
in those tweets were collected, creating a collection of 114 texts. To this was 
added a UK wide search of newspapers (national and regional), using the search 
terms of ‘UKIP’, ‘Rural’ and ‘Renewables’, for the period between January 
2013 and April 2014.  The search term ‘energy’ was inexact, as it was used about the 
challenge presented by UKIP rather the policy in question.  When duplicates were removed 
this created a collection of 89 articles, notices, and letters, covering the breadth of the UK. 
Previous studies of internet based materials have tended to focus on collecting web pages by 
key terms or through databases of press materials through keyword search (G Cook, Reed, & 
Twiner, 2009; Lockie, 2006).  The development of the capabilities of the qualitative analytic 
software, in this case, the latest version of Nvivo 10, has allowed for the management of 
                                                     
1 No assumption is made as to the authorship of the tweets, only that they are on the 
approǀed accouŶt of the Ŷaŵe politiciaŶ.  GoodǁiŶ aŶd Milazzo report that Farage’s 
account at times is operated by members of his staff (Goodwin and Milazzo 2015).  
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larger bodies of text and for the combination of automated coding alongside that conducted 
manually. 
 
The coding frame for these collections of texts was developed through an 
iterative process with the coding of Helmer’s Twitter feed, described above, 
providing the initial round of key terms and concepts (G Cook, Pieri, & Robbins, 2004). The 
next round of coding was informed by the capacity of the software to provide word frequency 
counts of the entire corpus as well as selected groups of texts. Through comparison between 
the inductive coding and the word frequency charts, an integrated set of codes was developed 
with specific queries answered by targeted searches through the corpus.  The software allows 
for searches that include the context of a word, or the degree which stemmed words and 
synonyms can be collected. In this way, the software and the size of the corpus allow for a 
form of qualitative enquiry that is enabled by access to a scope and precision of data retrieval 
only recently facilitated by the software.  This approach makes it distinct from the forms of 
data enquiry using algorithms and programmed searches that are being developed in the 
analyses of ‘big data’ investigations of social media.   
 
Strategic uses of Twitter 
 
Social media offers the opportunity for interactivity with other users through options which 
can be used in separately or in combination, these include: directing readers to other pieces of 
information or opinion (see discussion below) through hyperlinks, re-Tweeting (RT)  or 
repeating the tweets of others, engaging with other users through directing messages to them 
by using their Twitter name or taking part in more general discussions with indexing terms or 
in Twitter terminology hashtags (#)(see above).   If we consider Roger Helmer’s Twitter 
account made scant use of indexing terms (#) during this period (1.8% of tweets).  This 
pattern suggests that its use was not to engage in wider debates happening on Twitter but 
rather to present his case and arguments only those who were following his account.  Such a 
strategy of not engaging with others via Twitter is evident in Table 1, slightly less than 11% 
of all Helmer’s tweets mention another organisation or Twitter user. 
 
A further consideration of Table 1 makes it clear that most of the mentions are of either 
Helmer’s colleagues in UKIP, Conservative journalists or climate sceptic think tanks, 
with the rest accounted for by brief exchanges with opponents. In this way, Twitter is 
being used to reinforce his networks, and there is a degree of reciprocation with Farage 
mentioning Helmer 5 times. The data in Table 1 suggests that the primary use being made of 
Twitter by Helmer, and it appears his colleagues, was to focus on creating political content 
and sharing it with their Twitter followers. Such a strategy makes it distinct from newspapers, 
but more akin to leaflets and pamphlets, in that they are public documents directed to 
particular groups.  The main @UKIP account representing the party as a whole did make use 
of hashtags such as #ukip, #farageonfriday, #ukipspring, #teamnigel, suggesting that its role 
was to engage in a different form of dialogue.  A detailed comparison of the words most 
frequently used by the three Twitter accounts representing UKIP presents another aspect of 
how they are being used. While Farage as leader of the party is promoting UKIP, his 
Conservative opponents and his campaigning activities, he mentions energy policy only 18 
times.  Helmer is engaged in promoting UKIP but is also creating political content about his 
policy brief through his blogging, linking to the content of those he agrees with and re-
posting their materials through Re-tweeting. With a small amount of time taken with directly 
debating with opponents but a greater effort placed on framing their arguments and attacking 
their positions. 
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Rural life  
 
Helmer, and to a lesser degree, Farage present a conservative picture of rural life in which 
pubs, traditional landscape, and hunting with hounds predominate.  Farage, with his 
reputation for a fondness for a pint of beer, focused one tweet on the importance of the pub.     
Not only does @DPJHOdges get my local [pub] wrong (I have 2, mind) but he also misses 
the point that in rural England these things do matter. 
(Farage, Tweet, 12/12/2012) 
Helmer, by contrast, has a slightly wider frame of reference, much of which is concerned 
with hunting with hounds and its defence:  
RSPCA blows £330,000 of charity money persecuting the Heythrop Hunt.  Sensible people 
will resolve never to give them another penny (Helmer, Tweet, 19/12/2012) 
 
Boxing day greetings to Hunt Supporters everywhere.  I’m planning to get to the Fernie Meet 
in Great Bowden (Helmer, Tweet, 26/12/2013) 
Rural pollution is more closely identified with litter and a threat to the existing visual quality 
of the countryside and the landscape a theme repeated in the next section as well.  A lasting 
legacy of the 2012 Olympics was: 
Seems we've inspired a new generation of cyclists. But are they leaving the 
empty Red Bull cans along country lanes? 
(Helmer, Tweet, 07/08/2012) 
And in the following year: 
Is it time to ask Coke and McDonalds to sponsor litter-teams in country lanes to 
recover and recycle their discarded packaging? 
(Helmer, Tweet, 03/03/2013) 
Helmer only mentions agriculture four times once to blame floods on EU policies, twice to 
highlight UKIP’s policy to pay organic farmers less for agri-environmental work and once in 
passing. Rural life in this account is not contemplated in any depth but is constructed as 
something under threat from litter, ‘greens’, those people who oppose hunting with hounds 
and most significantly the EU via RE technologies.   
 
Messages about renewable energy 
 
This focus on shaping and spreading political messages starts with a deprecation of wind 
turbines and most forms of RE. Opposition to wind turbines is frequent and repeated; 
they are presented as unsightly, expensive, and ineffective.   
Because they’re [wind turbines] despoiling our countryside, driving up energy 
prices, and undermining our economic competitiveness. 
(Helmer, Tweet, 05/08/2013) 
 
Whilst you reach for your jumper to save on heating bills the EU gives your money to     the 
energy companies to…(weblink) 
(Farage, Tweet, 28/10/2013) 
 
The current landscape and its aesthetic qualities are partly reflected in this 
response about shale gas extraction or ‘fracking’, that fossil fuels are less visually intrusive: 
@AGrumpyGit Far happier with a fracking well than with the four large wind 
turbines we actually have close to the village. 
(Helmer, Tweet, 24/09/2013) 
The turbines are identified with UKIP’s opponents, which in turn are 
viewed as being against the economic progress of the nation and of damaging 
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the rural landscape (in chronological order): 
National Trust: "Turbines have grace & beauty". No they don't. They have 
waste & subsidy. 
(Helmer, Tweet, 25/02/2013) 
 
Friends of the Earth Spokesman: "We don't want an energy policy that wrecks 
our green & pleasant land". He must mean wind farms. 
(Helmer, Tweet, 05/08/2013) 
 
Here we go again. Greens implacably opposed to industry, jobs, prosperity 
(Helmer, Tweet, 28/09/2013) 
 
@ret_ward Because they are despoiling our countryside. driving up energy prices, and     
undermining our economic competitiveness  
(Helmer, Tweet, 05/08/2013)   
 
Later this takes on a more concrete form in a threat to house prices:  
Good piece on house price impact of wind farms from ‘Support Melton Against Rural     
Turbines (SMART) [web link]. (Helmer, Tweet, 07/12/2013)  
One of the aspects of the countryside that needs to be protected is productive land 
that is covered by solar farms or used by other RE technologies: 
Waitrose [Supermarket chain] warns of food shortages & inflation. Meantime 
Peterbro' Council wants to put wind & solar across 900 acres of prime farming 
land. 
(Helmer, Tweet, 05/01/2013) 
 
Just been in Peterbro’[Peterborough], where they want to turn 3000 acres of 
prime agricultural land into a solar farm. Harvesting subsidies, not cereals. 
(Helmer, Tweet, 01/02/2013) 
 
Just as it is evident from most of these Tweets, the arguments are linked. The Tweet below 
manages to connect the passionate, the symbolic, and an attack on the populist trope of 
‘political correctness’:  
Most of all, I hate wind turbines because they’re symbols of monstrous pointless waste, and 
futile political correctness.  
(Helmer, Tweet, 01/07/2012) 
Helmer’s arguments do not just link his rejection of wind farms and 
renewables to a case that they are the products of a subsidy system, but also to 
scepticism about the reality of climate change. This argument is often expressed indirectly 
through tackling the ‘climate alarmism’ that he claims is perpetuated by UKIPs 
opponents. 
Climate alarmism: Why we should challenge the ‘scientific consensus’ (web link). Andhow 
money drives green attitudes.  
(Helmer, Tweet, 07/10/2013) 
The web link takes the reader to Helmer’s blog where he explains his position in 
more detail, seeing that climate change advocates are driven by their interest in the 
subsidies provided by the state: 
Gallowglaich fails to understand the processes by which government funding, 
regulation and lobbying work. Big companies, to get a hearing, have to genuflect to the 
current orthodoxy. If a major oil company went to talk to the European Commission and took 
a climate-sceptic view, they simply wouldn’t get a hearing. Of course Shell’s forecasts reflect 
the orthodoxy.  
(‘Fossil Fuels are the Future’ Helmer, 2013) 
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Companies find advantage in reflecting the ‘orthodoxy’, as do individuals, 
Helmer admits to gaining a £1000 a year from the subsidy for the solar panels on his 
Roof, but ultimately this alarmism is driven by the EU and their insistence on the importance 
of climate change.  By implication only courageous individuals, prepared to set self-interest 
aside, will tell the truth. 
 
It is not just the institutions of the EU that receive criticism from Helmer but the IPCC 
(International Panel on Climate Change) in the sample, 78 tweets mention the IPCC. 
None of those references involve positive terms, but it is ‘bogus’, ‘falling apart’ 
‘doctored’, ‘formalised guesswork’, ‘decisively disproved’ ‘absurd’. Readers are 
Frequently directed to climate sceptic websites and, as noted above, Helmer is a frequent ‘re-
tweeter’ of posts by climate sceptic think tanks. This rejection of climate change is not 
simplistic, in a reply to two opponents he explained, “And we’re not sceptical about climate 
research. We’re sceptical about the IPCC’s dodgy assumptions and modelling” (Helmer 
Tweet 18/03/201). In this way, Helmer attacks those who are seeking to raise concerns about 
climate change, then links this to the overarching project of UKIP to withdraw the UK from 
the EU and positions himself as being against ‘flawed’ science, not the scientific process 
itself. 
 
 
Linked Media 
 
From the 12 months of Helmer’s Twitter feed coded manually, it was possible to recover 
114 documents, of which 18 linked to ‘The Telegraph’ or ‘Sunday Telegraph’, 8 to UKIPs 
own publicity, 5 to ‘The Daily Mail’ or Mail on-line, 6 to a range of US-based 
newspapers and 46 to a range of climate change sceptic websites, the remaining 31 were from 
a variety of other news sources ranging from ‘The Wall Street Journal’ to ‘The Spectator’ 
magazine.   
 
The coverage in the Telegraph newspapers and the Mail in print and on-line was uniformly 
hostile to RE technologies and policies to support them.  An example of the reporting is the 
article reporting comments by the then Environment Minister Owen Paterson: “‘Soviet’ wind 
farm subsidies blight rural lives and may have worst impact than climate change, says 
environment minister” (10/10/2012).  Another article on the Telegraph’s blogging site by 
James Delingpole attacks the IPPC:  
IPCC lead author Dr Richard Linden has accused it of having “sunk to a level of hilarious 
incoherence.  Nigel Lawson has called it “not science but mumbo jumbo.” The     Global 
Warming Policy Foundation’s Dr David Whitehouse has described the IPCC’s     panel as 
“evasive and inaccurate” in the way it tried to dodge the key issue of the 15-    year at least 
pause in global warming. (Delingpole 6/10/2013) 
That all those he cites are well-known climate change sceptics. Lord Lawson launched the 
Global Warming Policy Foundation (GWPF) which is not mentioned by Delingpole as he 
continues to argue, “The man-made global warming scare story has not a shred of scientific 
credibility” and that its defenders hide behind a “barrage of lies, ad homs, coverups, rank-
closings, blustering threats”.   
 
The blog posts include a wide variety of climate change sceptic websites, some based in the 
US but also UK sites such as ‘Bishop Hill’ and the now defunct ‘Lost Horizons’ (how the 
EU’s obsession with wind energy is destroying Britain’s coastlines & communities) blog.  
Most of the blogs are engaged in a continuous sceptical commentary on the IPCC and the 
climate change arguments generally, highlighting scientific papers that confirm their 
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arguments.  They are acute in observing what they see as contradictions with, or between, the 
arguments of their opponents, arguing that if the detail is not consistent, then the whole case 
is flawed.  
In a prime example of how the warmists cannot get their story straight, Borenstein’s article 
turns former Vice President Al Gore’s Antarctic claims and 60 Minutes’ claims on their head. 
(AP’s Seth Borenstein 10/10/2012)  
Collectively they provide a constant stream of rebuttal; contention, and commentary on the 
policy headlines regarding climate change instead of on RE technologies.  
 
As a subsection of the blogs are reports by think tanks, principally the Institute of Economic 
Affairs (IEA) which promotes free market thinking, the GWPF as mentioned above and 
Civitas a non-party think tank promoting “the enduring ideals that have made Britain a 
fortress of liberal civilisation.”   The latter during this period were pushing a report, 
“Electricity Costs: The folly of wind-power” which broadly coincided with UKIP policy to 
electricity generation:  
Nuclear power and gas-fired CCGT are therefore the preferred technologies for generating 
reliable and affordable electricity.  There is no economic case for wind-power.  (p.ii)  
     
If it were not for the renewables targets set by the Renewables Directive, wind-power would 
not even be entertained as a cost-effective way of generating electricity and/or cutting 
emissions.  The renewables targets should be renegotiated with the EU. (p.iv)  
 
The think tanks sober and considered evidence contrasts to the broadly polemic and 
rumbustious knock about of much of the blog material.  All the linked material is consistent 
in adding to Helmer’s case about renewables, and the broader strategy of using Twitter to 
direct subscribers towards materials establishing his case.   
 
Newspaper coverage 
 
Social media provides only a partial understanding of the political messages of UKIP. 
The analysis of the newspaper coverage of UKIP reveals a slightly different pattern of 
engagement but the same controversies. The search using the terms ‘UKIP’, ‘rural’ 
and ‘renewables’, which produced the commentary on UKIPs activities but also the work of 
opponents to their policies and campaigns. 
 
The letters sections of several regional newspapers have been an arena in which UKIP’s 
various representatives tackled the question of RE in a rural context and in turn where they 
were challenged by their opponents. In the aftermath of the local government elections in 
May 2013 several correspondents wrote to the Hunts Post (Huntingdonshire District, 
Cambridgeshire) to point out the advance of UKIP because of their opposition to a wind 
turbine development in the area: 
 
It is interesting to note that UKIP has claimed several seats in the 
County council elections, including the ward covering this wind farm. 
Could this be because its manifesto included the following?: ‘We will 
stand up for local decision-making and fight proposals like unwanted 
housing developments, unwanted out-of-town supermarkets and 
inappropriate energy schemes like incinerators, wind and solar farms 
that will ruin the character of our communities (Wood, 2013). 
 
Reed  
 13 
By grouping RE projects with supermarkets and incinerators, as to be opposed by local 
people after imposition by those outside of the community, UKIP are suggesting a localist 
agenda.  Another correspondent casts this in party political terms:  
UKIP has taken a stand and rural communities are voting for their 
candidates because of their anti-wind farm views. In rural communities 
traditional Conservatives have had enough and the sooner local and 
national government realise this [the] better. 
I am pleased my newly elected county councillor is from UKIP 
(Lane-Ley, 2013). 
These are the only references to land based renewables in the 12 months of press 
coverage but in the far west of England, UKIP was busy opposing a proposal for the 
‘Atlantic Array’ of off-shore turbines in the Bristol Channel. The press coverage of the 
opposition to the array was given a boost when the prospective Parliamentary candidate for 
the Conservative Party in the area joined the UKIP led campaign: 
This is not a party political issue - I’m not working with Steve 
[Crowther] under any banner. I’m working with him because of all the 
work Slay the Array has done in effectively opposing the scheme - he 
has experience and expertise in this (North Devon Gazette, 2013). 
As well as being a local councillor Steve Crowther was at the time the national 
Chairman of UKIP. Farage had written an opinion piece during the local elections in the 
South West newspaper committing UKIP to binding referenda on planning applications 
where one was requested: 
Planning also has a big role to in another of UKIP’s key policies, that of energy. The 
South West is to be blighted by ever increasing quantities of wind farms, both on and 
off shore. There are highly subsidised, uneconomic, impractical and frankly not worth 
the money that those who are suffering increased taxes and fuel bills have to pay for 
them (Farage, 2013). 
At the end of November 2013, the developers dropped the planned scheme citing 
uncertainties about the financing of the scheme, allowing Crowther to announce that 
this was “a victory for good sense and people power” on the local BBC news (BBC News, 
2013). 
 
The other theme that appears in the local press is the debate about climate change 
denial and with it the opportunity for UKIP candidates to promote other forms of 
‘renewable energy’. Frederick Rapsey, an unsuccessful UKIP candidate for the County 
Council elections could thank an earlier letter writer to the East Anglian Daily Times 
for allowing him to rehearse his enthusiasms, although his correspondent had argued 
that UKIP’s energy policy had been written on the back of one of Mr Farage’s ‘fag 
packets’: 
Of course it is imperative to properly research whether the current 
climate change is part of the natural rhythm or accelerated by the 
intervention of humanity (Rapsey, 2013). 
After promoting the possibility that nuclear fusion might be near to realisation and that 
existing renewables are too expensive, he suggests that others might be considered: “For 
example - the Severn Barrage: geo-thermal; hydro-electric power from dams (Rapsey, 2013).  
Unwilling to acknowledge the mockery of his correspondent, Rapsey 
repeated Helmer’s themes of scepticism to climate change and the promotion of 
unrealised future energy sources 
 
The other theme that the correspondents of UKIP take up about the high price of energy, a 
burden to domestic consumers and British business alike.  Dr Bev Wilkinson in the Yorkshire 
Post described it thus: 
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No wonder Nigel Farage is having a field day at the polls, being the 
only party leader not to be dazzled in the phoney green headlights of 
the carbon-free energy myth that is causing the country to swerve into 
energy impoverished suicide. 
 
Only UKIP seems to be prepared to spell out the reality that our 
draconian carbon reduction targets are clearly ill thought out and in 
fact, by all reasonable calculations, incompatible with affordable and 
available power for this country (Wilkinson, 2013). 
As well as the consistent UKIP message about the un-affordability and inefficiency of RE, it 
illustrates a tactic of all of the UKIP media.  The evidence of UKIP success is that its 
spokespeople and correspondents say that it is being so, and offer only assertions as proof.    
 
Discussion  
 
The analysis of the UKIP media output both on Twitter and the national media reveals a 
shallowness of engagement with the topic of renewable energy. Shallow in 
that it would seem from the media coverage that there was only one campaign against 
a renewable energy project with a noticeable presence of UKIP.  There is much claiming of 
UKIP being in the vanguard of a revolt against renewables, but largely by UKIP 
spokespeople and candidates with very little evidence presented to support these claims. 
UKIP does not engage in any depth with rural issues either the politics of rural areas or the 
politics of the rural other than stereotypes about village pubs (Farage) or passing references 
to hunting with hounds (Helmer).  
 
The themes pursued are climate change denial or scepticism, an emphasis on the price of 
energy, the subsidies and visual impacts of renewables and the detachment of elected 
politicians at national and local levels. Part of this attack is on what they describe as ‘political 
correctness’ to undermine what they perceive of the existing consensus. It would seem from 
this analysis that UKIP is using the issue of renewable energy in an opportunistic manner, 
claiming through their national spokespeople a leadership that they have not demonstrated. 
Rather they appear to be attempting to mobilise disillusioned Conservative voters who did 
not have any allegiance to the Coalition government’s policies (Kellner, 2014). 
 
Of wider importance is the way in which UKIP is conforming to larger trend 
amongst ideological conservatives in questioning climate change and in their tactics in 
the use of social media (Conover et al., 2012). Many of the tweets analysed for this 
paper and indeed reported above are ‘political content’ rather than retweets of others 
or links to other media. This theme is echoed in the use of the letters pages of local 
newspapers where they serve as a reinforcement of the key political messages of 
UKIP’s energy policy. In this way, UKIP are engaged not in debate or discussion with 
their opponents but in repeating their positions. Conover and colleagues describe this 
as taking the opportunity that social media presents to; “facilitate the rapid 
dissemination of political frames, making it easy for the main talking points to be 
communicated directly to a large number of constituents, rather than having to subject 
messages to the traditional media filter” (Conover et al., 2012:2).  This would appear 
consistent with Helmer’s use of Twitter, in that he is directing those following his feed to 
resources that will enable and inform their arguments.  He invests considerable energies in 
finding confirmatory evidence and argument, as well as creating his political materials.  
Social media in this instance is not being used to enhance dialogue or debate directly but 
strengthen the networks of those already of a similar political persuasion.  
Reed  
 15 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper makes four contributions, one methodological and three concerning the role of 
social media in political discussions of energy policy and more widely.  The analysis of 
social media has tended towards quantitative methodologies and very large data sets, in a 
qualitative analysis of a relatively small sample, this paper has sought to establish the utility 
of analysing social media alongside other forms of political communication.  Thorough 
analysis has determined the strategies of those political actors using social media and how 
they are crafting their political messages and use of the media to further their project.  In 
these behaviours, they correspond to the tactics used by conservative activists identified in 
the US.  Discourse analysis demonstrates that they are framing topics that are novel to UKIP 
as adjuncts to the major themes the party relies on for support.  Repetition of key messages 
and communicating with an in-group of supporters is a way of using social media that is 
distinct from other forms of political communication.  Much of this focus appears to be 
directed to opinion formers working in the print media.     
 
Concerning energy policy, opposition to RE schemes by UKIP is not a reflection of a 
groundswell of opposition groups, and it certainly does not appear to have a role in initiating 
or leading such movements. Rather UKIP’s role is to attempt to articulate aspects of the 
various opposition groups and to try to offer to these groups a route to national political 
representation.  It is also quickly apparent that the opposition to RE is about an appeal to the 
existing landscape as a reflection of national autonomy and a narrow view of the role of rural 
areas is taken (Lowe & Ward, 2007). The championing 
of fracking, fossil fuels and nuclear power is intended as both a provocation and a 
practical solution, although the contradictions of UKIPs position are never explicitly 
acknowledged. For example, championing binding local planning referenda could well 
ensure that none of UKIPs alternatives would be built.  Although as an expression of 
opposition these inconsistencies are less important than providing an outlet for frustrations 
with the political status quo to be expressed, and this seems to be in line with the desire of 
many of their supporters (Anstead, 2014). 
 
The position of UKIP is not one of outright rejection of climate change science but to 
establish doubt about the specifics and methods of assessing climate change. Oreskes 
and Conway demonstrate how this is entirely consistent with the tactics of free market 
advocates who have opposed scientific consensus on the harms of cigarette smoke and 
latterly climate change; “The enemies of government regulation of the marketplace became 
the enemies of science” (Oreskes & Conway, 2012:262). This does not account for how this 
doubt is then translated into a wider political sentiment. McCright and Dunlap observe that 
climate change in North America has become a partisan issue, as conflicts have not been 
resolved but extended as new issues have arisen. They argue that conservative commentators 
provide ‘elite cues’ that others follow and this, in turn, ensures that new issues are presented 
in a partisan way. The body of social media presented in this paper certainly suggests that this 
is being attempted in the case of UKIP and climate change, with only evidence that affirms 
scepticism being shown. This scepticism becomes intertwined as part of a wider framing of 
an insurgency against the elite and their status quo, which includes the scientific advice they 
are acting on, not just the adoption of specific technologies or policies. 
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McCright and Dunlap argue that this opposition to climate change is not going to be 
overcome by just providing more information but a greater understanding of how 
information is disseminated and interpreted (McCright & Dunlap, 2011). They suggest that 
we need to consider that ‘anti-reflexive’ movements are present in much of contemporary 
conservative thought, and action, which deserves greater attention from scholars.  This paper 
suggests the means by which such elite cues are being provided in the UK, and how they are 
included within frames of argument. 
 
The evidence of this paper suggests that UKIP is a very narrowly focused political party that 
during this period was not effective in creating a constituency of support in rural areas but 
more focused on influencing conservative thinking. UKIP speaks of, and to, the ideological 
differences within conservative thinking, rather than wider public debates.  It is not that 
UKIP is especially well organised or influential within these communities, but that they are 
able through the various media to create the perception that they might be.   This tactic 
reflects the decline in the Conservative control of rural areas, and the shifting politics of rural 
areas, as well as the broader fragility of the party system that insurgent smaller parties such as 
UKIP have exposed.  The particular case here is not the problem of acceptance of RE 
schemes within rural areas but the simplifications brought by this form of politics and the 
exclusionary temptations it will bring to those empowered by such political discourses. 
  
Reed  
 17 
Bibliography 
 
Abedi, A., & Lundberg, T. C. (2008). Doomed to Failure? UKIP and the Organisational 
Challenges Facing Right-Wing Populist Anti-Political Establishment Parties. 
Parliamentary Affairs, 62(1), 72-87. doi: 10.1093/pa/gsn036 
Anstead, N. (2014, 11/04/2014). Shouting across each other: post-debate coverage of the 
Clegg and Farage broadcasts. Political Insight. 
Arter, D. (2010). The Breakthrough of Another West European Populist Radical Right Party? 
The Case of the True Finns. Government and Opposition, 45(4), 484-504.  
BBC News. (2013, 26/11/2013). Atlantic Array wind farm dropped by developer. BBC News 
Online,. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-devon-25095868 
Betz, H.-G. (1993). The New Politics of Resentment Radical Right-WingPopulist Parties in 
Western Europe Comparative Politics, 25(4), 413-427.  
Castells, M. (2007). Communication,  Power And Counter Power In The Network Society. 
INternational Journal of Communication, 1, 238-266.  
Chadwick, A. (2000). Studying Political Ideas: a public political discourse approach. 
Political Studies, 48, 283-301.  
Chew, C., & Eysenbach, G. (2010). Pandemics in the Age of Twitter: Content Analysis of 
Tweets during the 2009 H1N1 Outbreak. PLoS ONE, 5(11), e14118. doi: 
10.1371/journal.pone.0014118 
Choudhruy, M. M., & Harrigan, P. (2014). CRM to social CRM: the integration of new 
technologies into customer relationship management. Journal of Strategic Marketing, 
22(2), 149-176.  
Conover, M., Goncalves, B., Flammini, A., & Menczer, F. (2012). Partisan asymmetries in 
online political activity. EPJ Data Science, 1(1), 6.  
Conover, M., Ratkiewicz, J., Francisco, B., Gonçalves, B., Flammini, A., & Menczer, F. 
(2011). Political Polarization on Twitter. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 
Fifth International AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Media. 
Cook, G. (2004). Genetically Modified Language. London: Routledge. 
Cook, G. (2015). 'A pig is a person' or 'You can love a fox and hunt it': Innovation and 
tradition in the discursive representation of animals. Discourse & Society. doi: 
10.1177/0957926515576639 
Cook, G., Pieri, E., & Robbins, P. (2004). ‘The Scientists Think and the Public Feels’: Expert 
Perceptions of the Discourse of GM Food. Discourse and Society, 15(4), 433-449.  
Cook, G., Reed, M., & Twiner, A. (2009). “But it’s all true!”  Commercialism and 
commitment in the discourse of  organic food promotion. Text and Talk, 29(2), 151-
173.  
Darier, E. (1999). Discourses of the Environment. Oxford: Blackwell. 
DiGrazia, J., McKelvey, K., Bollen, J., & Rojas, F. (2013). More Tweets, More Votes: Social 
Media as a Quantitative Indicator of Political Behavior. PLoS ONE, 8(11), e79449. 
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0079449 
Eltham, D. C., Harrison, G. P., & Allen, S. J. (2008). Change in public attitudes towards a 
Cornish wind farm: Implications for planning. Energy Policy, 36(1), 23-33.  
Etherington, J. (2009). The Wind Farm Scam: An Ecologists Evaluation. London: Stacey 
International. 
Evans, G., & Mellon, J. (2015). Working Class Votes and Conservative Losses: Solving the 
UKIP Puzzle. Parliamentary Affairs. doi: 10.1093/pa/gsv005 
Farage, N. (2013, 2/04/2013). Our pledge to support communities Western Daily Press.  
Ford, R., & Goodwin, M. J. (2014). Revolt on the Right. Explaining Support for the Radical 
Right in Britain. London: Routledge. 
Reed  
 18 
Ford, R., Goodwin, M. J., & Cutts, D. (2011). Strategic Eurosceptics and Polite Xenophobes: 
Support for the UK Independence Part (UKIP) in the 2009 European Parliament 
Elections. European Journal of Political Research, 51, 204-234. doi: 
doi: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2011.01994.x 
Foucault, M. (2000). Michel Foucault essential works of Foucault 1954-1984: volume 3 - 
power (Vol. 3). London: Penguin. 
Freeden, M. (1994). Political concepts and Ideological morphology. The Journal of Political 
Philosophy, 2(2), 140-164.  
Freeden, M. (1998). Ideologies and Political theory: A conceptual approach. Oxford: 
Claredon Press. 
Goodwin, M., & Milazzo, C. (2015). UKIP. Inside the Campaign to redraw the map ofBritish 
Politics. London: Oxford University Press. 
Huberman, B. A., Romero, D. M., & Wu, F. (2008). Social networks that matter: Twitter 
under the microscope. arXiv,. http://arxiv.org/abs/0812.1045 
Jacobsson, S., Bergek, A., Finon, D., Lauber, V., Mitchell, C., Toke, D., & Verbruggen, A. 
(2009). EU renewable energy support policy: Faith or facts? Energy Policy, 37(6), 
2143-2146.  
Kellner, P. (2014). Where UKIP gets its support [Press release] 
Lane-Ley, L. (2013, 15/05/2013). Spurious claims. Hunts Post.  
Lockie, S. (2006). Caputuring the sustainability agenda: Organic foods and media discourses 
on food scares, environment, genetic engineering and health. Agriculture and Human 
Values, 23, 313-323.  
Lord Ashcroft. (2012). “They’re thinking what we’re thinking” Understanding the UKIP 
temptation (pp. 33). London: Lord Ashcroft. 
Lowe, P., & Ward, N. (2007). Sustainable Rural Economies: Some Lessons from the English 
Experience. Sustainable Development, 15, 307-317.  
Matless, D. (1998). Landscape and Englishness. London: Reaktion Books. 
McCright, A. M., & Dunlap, R. E. (2011). Cool dudes: The denial of climate change among 
conservative white males in the United States. Global Environmental Change, 21(4), 
1163-1172. doi: 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.06.003 
McKay, G. (2000). Glastonbury. A Very English Fair . London: Victor Gollanz. 
Miller, C., Ginnis, S., Stobart, R., Krasodomski-Jones, A., & Clemence, M. (2015). Road to 
representivity. A Demos and IPSOS Mori on sociological research using Twitter. (pp. 
57). London: Demos. 
Mitchell, C., & Connor, P. (2004). Renewable energy policy in the UK 1990-2003. Energy 
Policy, 32(17), 1935-1947.  
Myers, G. (2004). Matters of Opinion. Talking about public issues. London: Cambridge. 
North Devon Gazette. (2013, 28/08/2013). Tory hope joins Atlantic Array opposition. North 
Devon Gazette.  
Oreskes, N., & Conway, E. M. (2012). Merchants of Doubt. How a Handful of Scientists 
Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming. London: 
Bloomsbury. 
Rapsey, F. (2013, 09/05/2013). I thank Mr Parkinson. East Anglia Daily Times.  
Reed, M. (2015). Actors in the distance:rural protests in the UK and the parliamentary 
parties. In D. Strijker, G. Voerman, & I. J. Terluin (Eds.), Rural protest groups and 
populist political parties: Wageningen Academic Publishers. 
Stevenson, R. (2009). Discourse, power, and energy conflicts: understanding Welsh 
renewable energy planning policy. Environment and Planning C: Government and 
Policy, 27(3), 512-526.  
Reed  
 19 
Titscher, S., Meyer, M., Wodak, R., & Vetter, E. (2000). Methods of text and discourse 
analysis. London: Sage. 
Tournier-Sol, K. (2015). Reworking the Eurosceptic and Conservative Traditions into a 
Populist Narrative: UKIP's Winning Formula? JCMS: Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 53(1), 140-156. doi: 10.1111/jcms.12208 
Turcotte, J., York, C., Irving, J., Scholl, R. M., & Pingree, R. J. (2015). News 
Recommendations from Social Media Opinion Leaders: Effects on Media Trust and 
Information Seeking. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 20(5), 520-
535. doi: 10.1111/jcc4.12127 
van der Horst, D. (2007). NIMBY or not? Exploring the relevance of location and the politics 
of voiced opinions in renewable energy siting controversies. Energy Policy, 35(5), 
2705-2714.  
Ward, B. (2013, 4 March ). Ukip's energy and climate policies under the spotlight. The 
Guardian. Retrieved from 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2013/mar/04/ukip-energy-climate-
policies 
Wellings, B., & Baxendale, H. (2015). Euroscepticism and the Anglosphere: Traditions and 
Dilemmas in Contemporary English Nationalism. JCMS: Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 53(1), 123-139. doi: 10.1111/jcms.12207 
Wilkinson, B. (2013, 14/06/2013). Last weeks energy bill. The Yorkshire Post.  
Wodak, R., KhosraviNik, M., & Mral, B. (2013). Right-Wing Populism In Europe: Politics 
and Discourse. London: Bloomsbury. 
Wood, V. (2013, 15/05/2013). UKIP Farm Fight. Hunts Post.  
Woods, M. (2005). Contesting Rurality: Politics in the British Countryside. Aldershot: 
Ashgate. 
Woods, M., & Goodwin, M. (2003). Applying the rural: governance and policy in rural areas. 
In P. Cloke (Ed.), Country Visions (pp. 245-259). 
 
  
Reed  
 20 
Name Tweets Retweets 
Climate Depot (Think Tank) 27 84 
@RogerHelmerMEP  83 
Thegwpft 
(The Global Warming 
Policy 
Foundation) 
2 57 
Dan Hannan MEP  42 51 
Nigel Farage MEP 8 47 
Sharethis 2 19 
UKIP 31  
HashtagerUk (UKIP 
opponent 
on Twitter) 
27  
James Delingpole 
(Conservative journalist) 
24 25 
Ret_ward (Bob Ward – 
Policy 
and Communications 
Director 
at Grantham Institute on 
Climate Change) 
25 1 
Mwt2008 (Mark Tebbutt – 
zero 
‘direct fossil fuel use since 
April 2011’) 
 19 
Totals 188 386 
 
